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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~I·:ClTRITY

TrrPLE

INSlT£\AXCI<~

AU I•:NCY, nm\· known as ~I·:CURI
TY TLTLE GrAR.AKTY C 0 ).1P.\\'Y, and ~ECURITY TITLE
l 0:\l P.\ :.;y, l'tah eorporations,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
1

:-:J·:CUHITY

T;;:·~

INSURANCE

Case No.
9925

\

CU:\rP1\XY. a California corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

1

Defendant .. Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing
Th~ Defendant-Appellant, Security Title Insurance
Company, a Utah corporation, petitions the Court for a
rehearing in the above entitled case, the Court by its
opinion filed Decen1ber 31, 1963, having affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.

This petition is based upon the facts which undisputably show that the plaintiffs do not have exclusive
n~P of tht> words "Security Title" and, therefore, such
words as a 1natter of law, could not have acquired a
~reondary meaning in favor of the plaintiffs. Further1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

uwre, the Court has overlooked the established law
which holds that even though a secondary meaning may
have been acquired, such does not give rise to a monopolistic right to the use of the words or name in
question, but only a right to require that another user
of the name properly distinguish itself.
McKAY AND BURTON
and MACOY A. Mcl\IURRAY
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Ut~h

' ,/r((.-~;1/
' (J ~ g( ~(/{/' L;Jf.- jf//.-/1
By ··;··--ii~~~~--A:·-~:r-~it~~:~:~~---·-···
(

I

;_{I
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SI•:CPHITY TITLE IXSFRANCI·~
.\(:K~~'"CY, now known as SECURITY rriTL~~ Gr ARANTY C 0 .MPA~Y. and
SECl~RITY
TITLE
CO~IP.. \XY, Utah corporations,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

1

Case No.
9925

- vs.SI·~CPHITY
CO~I P.. \~Y.

TITLE INSURANCE
a California corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Support
of Petition for Rehearing

POINT NO. I
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE ACQUIRED
A SECONDARY MEANING TO THE WORDS "SECURITY TITLE," THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH SHOW THAT
SUCH WORDS HAVE NOT BEEN EXCLUSIVELY
APPROPRIATED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND
HENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO SECONDARY
MEANIXG CAN ATTACH TO THE SAME IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS.

3
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This Court, by its silence, has in effect held, contrary to the well established law in the field, that a
secondary rneaning may attach to certain words in favor
of a non-exclusive user thereof. We call to the Court'~
attention that apparently, through oversight, no consideration was given to the matters of law referred to
in the two points considered in the defendant-appellant's
reply brief.
Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents based a major
portion of his argtunent on the finding of the trial
court that the words "Security Title" had acquired a
secondary rneaning in favor of plaintiffs. It was in
reply to this argument that we pointed out in our reply
brief on pages 5 through 9, it is imperative that for a
secondary meaning to attach to certain words or a
name, such words or name must exclusively identify the
clain1ant.
It is clear from the record that Security Title and
Abstract Company in Provo, Utah, is a separate entity,
not a party to this action, and was the first user of
the words "Security Title" ni the State of Utah in connection with title activities ( T. 123). Such company
still exists today. In addition, Security Title Company
in Ogden, Utah, and Security Title Company in Kaysville and Farmington, Utah, are separate entities.
Neither of plaintiffs owns or controls Security Title &
Abstract Company in Provo, Security Title Company
of Ogden, or Security ·Title Company in Kaysville and
Farmington. (R. 157, 158, 186, 188).
Plaintiffs did at the time of the trial attempt to
4
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:-~how that th(• use of the words "Security Title" by these
('ntiti('s and emnpanies other than the plaintiffs was
with the consent and agreeinent of the plaintiffs. HowPVI'I', such agreement and consent, even if they exist,
ur·p of no aid to plaintiffs.

In support of this proposition, the Court's attention
is invited to the case of Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk
Tl'achcrs' . :l,qeucy, 3 Fed. (2d) 7 (8CCA 1924), where
the Court said :
'"The evidence shows that the use of the
plaintiff's trade-name by the many local offices,
under the sanction of contracts made by the plaintiff assuming to license the use of the trade-name,
has caused the name to lose its distinctiveness as
the trade-name of the plaintiff. The service rendPred to teachers and officers of schools has for
man~· years represented generally to such persons and to the public, not the efforts, the experience, or the responsibility of the plaintiff, but of
the persons conducting these local offices. As
was said in Powell v. Birminghom Vinegar Brewing Co., 2 Ch. D. (L.R. 189·6) 54, 73: ''There is
another way in which a name originally a good
tradename may lose its character and become
publici juris, i.e., when the first person using
the nan1e does not claim the right to prevent
others from using it, and allows others to use
it without complaint. The name then comes to
denote the article and nothing more; the name
becmnes publici juris, and any one is at liberty
to make the article and call it by the name by
which it is usually known'."
'The evidence readily demonstrates that there has
been no such exclusive use of the words "Security Title"

5
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by either of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are both Utah
corporations. On Dece1nber 1, 1944, Security Title Company was incorporated (Ex. 9). This company did business in Salt Lake City until 1957, when it ehanged its
nmne to "Security Title Insurance Agency" (T. 126).
On June 21, 1962, after the commencement of this action,
the name was again changed to "Security Title Guaranty
Company," which is the present name of one of the
plaintiff corporations. The plaintiff "Security Title
Company" was incorporated in 19·57 and its functions
are limited to title activities in Salt Lake County ('T .128).

s:

In short, the plaintiffs at the trial would have had
to have demonstrated that the words "Security Title"
have been used exclusively and solely identified the
plaintiffs. See also Sterling Products Corp., vs. Sterling
Products, Inc., 45 Fed. Supp. 960 (S. D.N.Y. 1942).·
Another case illustrating the principle is Campbell
Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 81 F. Supp. 114 (D.C. Pa.
1948), the Court stated :
"·The essence of the trade-1nark is that it shall
be a true badge of origin indicating that the
contents to which it is affixed is the product of
the trade-mark proprietor and no others, or as it
it put by Nims, Unfair Competition and TradeMarks, Fourth Edition, Vol. Two, p. 1289: '***
it is vital to the existence of a trade-mark that
it should be used by one and by only one concern.
A trade-mark cannot serve two masters; it cannot identify two sources at the same time and
remain a trade-mark.' ''
The Campbell Soup Co. case involved a technical trademark. It follows that when considering the concept of
secondary meaning, the same rule would be applicable.
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--~

Xnrnerous authorities could be eited in support of
proposition.

thi~

In short, the plaintiffs at the trial would have had
to have demonstrated that the words ''Security Title''
have been used exclusively by and solely identified the
plaintiffs. See also Sterling Products Corp. vs. Sterling
Products, Inc., 45 Fed. Supp. 960 (S. D.N.Y. 1942).
In this regard, it is most significant that involved
in this case are two plaintiffs, each claiming the benefit
of a secondary meaning to the words "Security Title."
The very essence of "secondary meaning" is that certain
words identify one particular source. The question is
appropriately asked which one of the plaintiffs is identifit•d by the words "Security Title"~ Furthermore, the
words .. Security Title" in the Provo area certainly do
not refer to either of the plaintiffs. If any secondary
meaning has attached to those words, it would be in
favor of a local entity in the Provo area which is not
t>ven a party to this action. Certainly, the plaintiff
::;hould not be entitled to have enjoined the use of the
words "Security Title" in the Provo area when such
use causes no association whatsoever with either of the
plaintiffs in this case. Similarly, in the Farmington
and Davis County area, the words "Security Title" do
not refer to either of the plaintiffs but again considering the evidence nwst favorable to the plaintiffs merely
identify local entities in that area. The same is true
in the Ogden area.
This court has stated that the words "Security Title"
have acquired a secondary meaning. The defendantappellant has a right to ask who is identified by such

7
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words? The Provo Con1pany 1 Either or both of the
plaintiff companies in Salt Lake City 1 The Davis County cmnpany"? Or the Ogden company1
The very fact that the words "Security Title" identify so many sources in so many places in the State of
Utah, nullifies the possibility of a secondary Ineaning
attaching to the words in favor of any one single entity.
The fact that the plaintiffs attempted at the trial to
show that the use of the words "Security Title" by the
other entites and companies other than the plaintiffs was
with the consent and agreement of the plaintiffs, does
not substitute for the requirement of exclusive use. Such
agreement and consent, if such there be, only demonstrates that the plaintiffs have consented to a use which
by its very existence defeats a claim to secondary meaning. The very essence of the concept of "secondary
meaning" is identification of a single user.
These words of Judge Learned Hand in the case of
Coty v. LeBlurne Import Co., 292 F. 264 (1923) are
squarely in point: "But it is undoubtedly necessary that
it must signify a single source ... " See also: Shredded
Wheat Company v. Humphrey Cornell Company, 250
Fed 960 (CCA, 2d Cir., 1918); Bayer Cmnpany v. United
Drug Company, 272 F 505 (D.C.S.D. New York, 1921).
The court's attention is called to the fact that the
case of Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency,
supra, was a case involving an agreement. There, the
court recognized that such an agreement was futile to
prevent the words in question fron1 identifying other
sources. Hence, the very essence of "secondary meaning" was lost by agreement.
8
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POINT NO. II
CONTRARY TO WELL- ESTABLISHED LAW
WHICH \VOULD ONLY ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFFS
TO A RIGHT TO HAVE A SUBSEQUENT USER OF
THE WORDS DISTINGUISH ITSELF, THIS COURT
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT HAS INADVERTENTLY GRANTED THE
PLAINTIFFS A UNWARRANTED MONOPOLISTIC
RIGHT TO THE USE OF THE WORDS "SECURITY
TITLE.''

This Court has inadvertently granted to plaintiffs
a monopolistic right to the use of the words "Security
Title" throughout the whole of the State of Utah, contrary to well-established law governing relief that may
be granted in fair trade cases involving secondary
meaning.
Even if this Court, upon a reconsideration of this
math'r, should let stand its determination that a secondary 1neaning had attached to the words "Security
Title" in favor of plaintiffs, they are not entitled to a
monopoly in their use. This issue is neither new nor
novel. Courts throughout the country have considered
this problem and the holdings are legion that no such
monopolistic right exists.
In fair trade cases involving secondary meaning
the only right the person has in whose favor the secondary 1neaning of words has attached is to have the
second user enjoined in the runfair use of such words.
This is not a technical trade mark case where by statutes
governing the registration of technical trademarks, a
monopoly to the use of the mark on words is granted7
recognized and upheld.
9
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Courts that have considered the problems involved
in protecting a party in the use of words to which a
secondary meaning has attached, have one after another
declared that it is only an unfair use that should be
enjoined - not every use. Exmnples of such holdings
were set forth in defendant-appellant's brief on pages
9 through 14 thereof.
Some of authorities there cited, together with additional authorities, are as follows :

Armstrong Paint v. Nu-Enamcl Corp., 305 U.S. 315:
L.Ed 195 (1938) :
"This right of freedom does not confer a
n1onopoly on the use of the words. It is a men·
protection against their unfair use as a trademark or trade name by a competitor seeking to
palm off his products as those of the original
user of the trade name. This right of protection
from such use belongs to the user of a mark
which has acquired a secondary meaning."

Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 402, 403, (GCA,
Third Cir, 1924) :
'' ... the utmost the first user of such a name
after it has acq~tired a secondary meaning can
insist upon is that no one shall use it against
him in an 'unfair way. Accordingly, the second
user becomes an infringer only when he makes
an unfair use of the mark. Not any competition,
but only unfair competition on the part of such
user is actionable. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall
(80 U.S. 311, 324; 20 L.Ed. 581); Columbia Mills
v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 464, 14 S. Ct. 151, 37 L.Ed.
1144; Elgin Watch Co., v. III Watch Co., 179 U.S.
665, 21 S. Ct. 270, 45 L.Ed. 365." (Emphasis
added.)

10
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88¢ Stores, /11(·.,

l'.

11/artinez, 361 P. (2d) 809, (Ore.)

( 1001):
''Bttt Cl'('Jt assuming that plaintiff has created a secondary meauing in the use of the name
'Th(' 88¢ Store' or any other name ,plaintiff has
no ri9ht to restrict the use of that name except
a.., the 'Use interferes with pla,intiff's sale of merchandise, or the sale of m,erchandise by plaintiff's
eJtfranchisees over u·hich plaintiff has controls
relevant to the quality of the goods or services
Lchich the alleged trade name purports to represeut. Smith v. Dental Products Co., 7 Cir., 19·44,
140 F. (2d) 140, 145-148; Everett 0. Fisk & Co.
v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 8 Gir., 1924, 3 F. (2d)
7, 8-9; :L\Iorse-Starrett Products Co. v. 8teccone,
D.C. N.D. Cal. 1949, 86 F. Supp. 796, 805; Sage,
Trade-~Iark Licenses and 'Control,' 43 Trademark Reporter 675 (19'53); Comment, Developments in the Law; ·Trade-:iliarks and Unfair Competition, 68 Harv. L. Rev 814, 867, 874 (1955);
Note, Trade l\1ark-Law - Valid Use of Trade
Mark by Other Than Owner, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev.
482 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
Sterling Products Corporation v. Sterl-ing Products,
Inc., -!3 F. Supp. 960, 961, (1942):

·•rt is not the mere use of the word 'Sterling,'
but the method or manner of its use which determines the rights of the parties; in order for the
plaintiff to prevail it must show that defendants
make an unfair use of it."
Richmond Rernedies Co. v. Dr. Miles llfedical Co., 16
F. (2d) 598, p. 602 (CCA, 8th Cir. 1926):

If the trade-name consists of a descriptive
word, no monopoly of the right to use the smne
11
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can be acquired. This is but a corollary of the
proposition that a descriptive word cannot lw
the subject of a trademark. G. & C. :Merriam Co.
v. Saalfield (C.C.A.) 198 F. 369. Others may use
the same or similar descriptive word in connection with their own wares, provided they take
proper steps to prevent the public being deceived.
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co.,
supra; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co.,
supra; Allen B. \V risley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co.,
122 F. 796 (C.C.A. 8); Heide v. Wallace & Co.,
(C.C.A.) 135 F. 346; Trinidad Asphalt Co. v.
Standard Paint Co., 163 F. 977 (C.C.A. 8); Walter
Baker & Co. v. Gray, 192 F. 921, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.)
889 ( C.C.A. 8) ; G. & C. :Merriam Co. v. Saalfield
(C.C.A.) 198 F. 369; S.R. Feil Co. v. Jn. E.
Robbins Co. (C.C.A.) 220 F. 650.

Ilottston v. Berde, 2 N.W. 2d 9 p. 10, (Minn. 1942):
Where generic words are used in a tradename, it is only the manner of their use by another that is considered and restrained. There
must be confusion or deception with implicit representation that the goods of the latter are those
of the first user. Even so, only use which makes
unfair competition can be enjoined. Yellow Cab
Co. v. Cook's T. & T. Co., 142 l\1:inn. 120, 171 N.W.
269.

United Lace & Braid JJ!lfg. Co. v. Barthals Mfg. Co.,
221 Fed. 456 (D.C., E.D. New York, 1915):
A word n1ay acquire in trade a secondary
signification, differing from its primary meaning, and if it is used to persons in the trade
who will understand it, and be known and intended to understand it, in its secondary sense,
it will be none the less a falsehood, although in
its primary sense it may be true. One who uses

12
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language whieh will (•onvey to persons reading
or lwariug- it a particular idea which is false,
knowing and intending this to be the case, is not
to lw absolvPd frmn a eharge of falsehood because
in anotlwr sense, which will not be conveyed and
is not intended to be convPyt>d, it is true. In
::-;uch a east>, howPvPr, nwre proof of the use by
another of such rnake or word will not of itself
entitle the complainant to relief, for this would
be to give to the word full effect as a trade-1nark
while denying its validity as such. The cmnplainant rnust prove, further, that the defendant used
it under such circu1nstances or in such a manner
as to pass off his goods as the goods of the
complainant. Such circumstances must be made
out as will show wrongful intent in fact, or justify
that inference frmn the inevitable consequences
of the act complained of. When this is done, relief
against unfair cmnpetition will be awarded by
requiring the use of the 1nark by another to be
confined to its primary sense by such limitations
as will prevent misapprehension upon the question of origin.
~)S~

Spicer v. W. H. Bull llfedicine Co., 49 F. (2d) 980,
( 1931) :
"\V e think it is well established by the above
and other cases that, even where a secondary
1neaning of a word is established, others have the
right to use such word in its primary sense, provided it is so used as not to lead the public to
believe that it is purchasing the goods of one
who has established such secondary meaning."

G. d'; C . .~.11 crriwn Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. Rep.
369, 373 ( CCA, 6th Cir., 1912) :

''Here, then, is presented a conflict of right.
The alleged trespassing defendant has the right

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to use the word, because in its primary sense or
original sense the word is descriptive; but, owing
to the fact that the word has come to mean to
'
a part of the public, something else, it follows
that when the defendant approaches that same
part of the public with the bare word, and with
nothing else, applied to his goods, he deceives
that part of the public, and hence he is required
to accompany his use of the bare word with sufficient distinguishing marks normally to prevent
the otherwise normally resulting fraud."

A1nerican W althant Watch Co. v. U. S. Watch Co.,
173 Mass. 85 :
"Thus it appears that while the first selection of a descriptive name which later has acquired a secondary meaning does not carry with
it an exclusive right to its use, yet the first user
has a right to be protected against one who subsequently so uses the name as to deceive the
public and thereby take his trade from him; and
in affording him this protection the later comer,
when using the name, will be required to distinguish his goods and enlighten the trading public."
Dennison 111fg. v. Thomas Mfg., 94 Fed. 651 (Cir.
Ct., D. Del., 1899) :

". . . if such words, marks or symbols 'vere
used by one of them before the other and by association have come to indicate to the public that
the goods to which they are applied are of the
production of the former, the latter will not be
permitted, with intent to mislead the public, to
use such words, marks, or sy1nbols in such a
1nanner, by trade dress or otherwise, as to deceive
or be capable of deceiving the public as to the
origin, manufacture or ownership of the articles
to which they are applied; and the latter may be

14
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rPqnirPd, when using ~uch words, 1nark~, or synlbols, to place on articles of his own production
or the packages in which they are usually sold
sonwthing clearly denoting the origin, manufacture or ownership of such article~, or negativing
any idea that they were produced or sold by the
former."
Consistent with the law that the only relief the
plaintiffs ar entitled to is to have the defendant properly
identify itself are the numerous decisions which have
considered similar questions wherein specific identification requirements have been imposed. See for example
the cases cited on page 1'7 of the defendant-appellant's
initial brief and cases found among the many collected
by the annotator in 66 A.L.R. 948.
CONCLUSION
F,rom the cases which have decided matters concerning the acquisition of a "secondary meaning" of generic
words it would appear conclusive as a matter of law
that neither of the plaintiffs could have acquired in their
favor a secondary Ineaning to the words "Security
Title." Neither of the plaintiffs was the first user of
the words in the State of Utah nor has either of the
plaintiffs used the words exclusively, but have permitted
separate entities in Provo, Farmington and Ogden areas
to use the words to identify sources other than the
plaintiff.
Xevertheless, even if the Court is not disposed to
reconsider the finding that a secondary 1neaning has
attached to the words "Security Title" in favor of the
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plaintiff, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a monopoly
in the use of the words in question but are only Pntitled
to have the defendant appropriately identify itself. "\Ve
again invite the Court's review of the numerous decisions
cited in this and prior briefs supporting this contention.
In the briefs sub1nitted and oral argument to the
Court, Counsel has pointed out that the defendant has
already taken what it thought to be appropriate steps
of identification. It will, no doubt, be recalled that in
the use of its corporate name the defendant has consistently identified itself as being a company from Los
Angeles, California. However, the defendant is willing
to take any additional steps that this Court deems necessary to remove any probability of confusion between
itself as a California insurance company and the plaintiff Utah corporations.

Respectfully submitted,
1\:IcKAY and BURTON
and~OY A. Mc:JIURRAY
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By~I;;:c~;-A:-~I~1lr-,:~;.--Att~;:;;;:_~
for Defendant-Appellant
720 N" ewhouse Building
Salt Lake City, l'Ttah
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